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RESPONSE
FROM LOYALTY TO JUSTICE
ANDREW S. GOLD*
We all have good reason to act justly, but fiduciaries sometimes also
have an obligation to act justly out of loyalty. Bruce Green and Rebecca
Roiphe's new paper on the prosecutor as a fiduciary is a powerful
illustration of such loyalty.1 It also provides a compelling account of
the prosecutor's role within the criminal justice system. On their view,
prosecutors owe fiduciary duties that require them to pursue the abstract
cause ofjustice.' I wish to explore the implications of their approach for
fiduciary theory by teasing out several strands of their argument.
To begin, however, I will offer a caution. We should recognize that
violating a rule of loyalty does not inevitably equate to violating a rule
ofjustice.Justice is often thought to govern how we allocate something,
and if we adopt that view then acting loyally is not always a matter of
justice. After all, loyalty is not always concerned with allocations. Loyalty
may be concerned with keeping commitments, with partiality towards a
* Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to Evan Fox-Decent and Paul
Miller for helpful suggestions on ideas in this Paper. I have also benefited greatly from
prior conversations aboutjustice with the late John Gardner. Any errors are my own.
1. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69 AM.
U. L. REv. 805 (2020).
2. See id. at 823.
3. See H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 1, 21 (2d ed. 2008) (linking justice
to an allocation) ; John Gardner, What Is Tort Law for? Part]. The Place of Corrective Justice,
30 L. & PHIL. 1, 6-7 (2011) (endorsing this approach).
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loved one, with advancing the best interests of a beneficiary-and yet
not be concerned with allocating anything.'
John Gardner has offered a useful example to show how loyalty and
justice may have different concerns:
If I betray a friend and not another, then the first may wonder what
he did to deserve it, why he was picked out for bad treatment, etc.
But the answer may be: nothing, nothing at all. When I betrayed him
I wasn't distributing the benefits and burdens of the rule 'Don't
betray your friends'. I wasn't distributing anything. I was just plain
violating the rule, and if the friend I betrayed wants to complain
about this, it is my disloyalty he should begin by complaining about,
for the rule I violated is a rule of loyalty.5
We might think Gardner is mistaken here. Isn't there a kind of
injustice in this case? Not necessarily, for as Gardner further explains:
If he [the betrayed friend] thinks there is an added insult-ie an
injustice-in the fact that I didn't betray my other friend instead, or
as well, then he judges me by his rules, not mine. I am simply an
ordinary moderately loyal soul aiming not to betray anyone, and
occasionally failing. Whereas my aggrieved friend who complains of
injustice mistakes me for some kind of allocation fanatic who spends
time deciding whom he should betray, given that he is going to
betray someone.
I think Gardner is right, and we should be careful not to blend loyalty
questions and justice questions unless the two are genuinely related.
Yet, even if we start from this premise, loyalty and justice can still
intersect. One context is arguably implicit in Gardner's example above:
sometimes we must allocate the benefits of our loyalty to multiple
beneficiaries.7 If that allocation is handled unfairly by the loyal party (for
instance, if the loyal party benefits one beneficiary at the expense of
another without good reason), it may well be an injustice. Too much
loyalty to one party and not enough loyalty to another is an allocation
problem. Where loyalty's benefits are being allocated among multiple
parties, this inevitably raises justice concerns.
Nonetheless, I have a different context in mind: in some cases, the
substantive content of our loyalty obligations may be concerned with justice. A
4. SeeJOHN GARDNER, The Virtue ofJustice and the Character of Law, in LAW As A LEAP
OF FAITH: ESSAYS ON LAW IN GENERAL 253 (2012) [hereinafter GARDNER, LAw AS A LEAP
OF FAITH].
5. GARDNER, LAw AS A LEAP OF FAITH, supra note 4, at 253.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 253-54.
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loyal fiduciary may have an obligation to pursue justice because that is
what it means to be loyal to her beneficiary, or because that is what it
means to be loyal to a cause she has undertaken to advance.' Let's call
such a loyalty obligation a 'justice-focused" loyalty obligation. Such
obligations will be the topic of this Paper.
Justice-focused loyalty obligations take different forms. For example,
in some cases a judge may have a fiduciary obligation to advance the
cause of justice because the judge owes loyalty to that cause.' The
judge's role may simply require the pursuit of justice without more,
such that the obligation does not have any particular beneficiary; the
duty at issue does not involve loyalty to any person or entity.10 To the
contrary, it is the pursuit of justice in the abstract that counts as loyalty
for this judge. In other cases, a fiduciary may owe her loyalty to a
particular individual or group of individuals, and the content of this
loyalty requires the fiduciary to pursue justice on behalf of the parties
to whom she is loyal." I take Green and Roiphe to be suggesting that
the second category governs prosecutors.12
What is especially interesting about cases of justice-focused loyalty is
that complying with loyalty obligations in such cases can potentially
alter an individual's approach to pursuing justice. We might think that
whatever our motivations, the pursuit of justice should come out the
same way. Notice, however, that different norms of justice-some
sound, some unsound-may be in conflict in a given fact pattern. They
cannot all be pursued to the fullest extent, and pursuing one norm of
justice could make it impossible to pursue another.
One way such conflicts may be resolved is through second-order
norms ofjustice.13 There may well be norms of justice that tell us how
other norms of justice should operate when they are in conflict. For
8. Cf. Andrew S. Gold, The Internal Limits on Fiduciary Loyalty, 65 AM. J.Juxis. 65,
65-66 (2020) (noting that loyalty may be concerned with the proper functioning of
the legal system).
9. See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 513, 570 (2015) (indicating that fiduciary loyalty may not be owed to any
determinate beneficiary, and that it instead may involve advancement of an abstract
goal or purpose concerning justice).
10. See id. at 562-63.
11. See id. at 516 (describing service mandates which involve loyalty owed to
determinate parties).
12. See generally Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 829.
13. See Andrew S. Gold, Private Rights and Private Wrongs, 115 MICH. L. REv. 1071,
1093 (2017) (discussing the role of second-order norms ofjustice in legal systems).
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example, second-order norms of justice may tell us that a norm of
procedural justice should prevail over a norm of corrective justice.14
But it is not just second-order norms ofjustice that may operate in
this fashion. Notably, it is also possible that loyalty obligations will tell
us to prioritize one kind of justice over other kinds of justice. In that
case, it is our concern with loyalty rather than directly with norms of
justice that is doing the work, and the resulting outcome will bear the
distinctive mark of whatever it is that loyalty requires. Justice may
sometimes require us to be loyal in a certain way, but it is equally true
that loyalty may sometimes require us to be just in a certain way.
For example, I have argued in The Right of Redress that the state as a
fiduciary may owe its citizens private rights of action or an equivalent
means for individuals to respond to the wrongs they have suffered.15
On this view, the state has a loyalty obligation to facilitate its citizens'
pursuit of a particular type of justice-the justice in redress-in light
of the relationship between the state and its citizens." This view could
be justified on several grounds, including the reality that the state
largely prohibits private acts of self-help.17 While the state plausibly has
a general responsibility to advance various types of justice (e.g.,
corrective, retributive, preventive, and distributive justice), it has
loyalty obligations that call for it to provide a means for its citizens to
obtain redress.18 Such loyalty obligations are not applicable to everyone,
but instead the result of a distinctive state-citizen fiduciary relation with
attached duties of loyalty.
A rather different concern arises if a prosecutor is acting on behalf
of the public in Green and Roiphe's sense.19 One might think that a
prosecutor as an agent should always be accountable to public preferences.
On the other hand, one might not think this should hold true because
prosecutors are not ordinary agents. Indeed, Green and Roiphe contend
that prosecutors should not always follow the preferences of the public in
14. See ANDREW S. GOLD, THE RIGHT OF REDRESS 178 (2020) (noting that "a legal
system might need to adopt second-order norms of justice that govern trade-offs
between other norms of justice"). On the relation between equitable justice and the
justice in redress, see id. at 199-202.
15. See generally id. ch. 6. For discussion that is especially relevant here, see id. at
155-59.
16. Id. at 146-47, 156-57.
17. Id. at 142-45, 157.
18. See generally id. at 139-59.
19. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 829.
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pursuing justice.20 Why not? There are various policy reasons, but it is
in part because on their account the prosecutor is not that kind of
fiduciary.2 1 Prosecutors owe a different kind of loyalty in their capacity
as public fiduciaries; a loyalty that is not constrained in all cases by a
beneficiary's preferences.22 It bears noting that justice is very much at
stake under any plausible interpretation of a prosecutor's role. Notice,
however, that loyalty obligations may determine the kind of justice to
be pursued.
Still, we must understand the loyalty obligation at issue if it is to play
a part in our legal analysis. With this in mind, a point of clarification is
in order. At times, my work with Paul Miller on fiduciary governance
mandates is cited in support of Green and Roiphe's account.23 Fiduciary
governance mandates lack a determinate beneficiary.24 Green and Roiphe
appear instead to be describing a service mandate-i.e., a fiduciary
mandate that has a determinate beneficiary.25 While the definition of "the
public" may be imprecise (and with good reason), the public is specifically
noted as a beneficiary in Green and Roiphe's work."
As noted, a fiduciary governance mandate lacks a determinate
beneficiary, and this bears on the kind of loyalty a fiduciary owes.27 A
charitable purpose trust is a good illustration. As Miller and I note:
When a trustee for a charitable trust acts to advance the trust's purposes,
doubtless her success will redound to the benefit of the public. It does
not follow that the public is a beneficiary of the trust. The trustee's
mandate is defined by the purposes established for the trust, and she
owes her fidelity to those purposes rather than to any person or group
of persons who hope to benefit from their fulfillment.28
20. See id. at 813, 837-38.
21. Id. at 843-44.
22. Id. at 837-38.
23. See, e.g., id. at 809 n.10 (describing fiduciary governance mandates in
connection with Green & Roiphe's account of a prosecutor's fiduciary mandate). On
fiduciary governance mandates generally, see Miller & Gold, supra note 9, at 523-24.
24. See Miller & Gold, supra note 9, at 523 (discussing the abstract nature of
governance mandates).
25. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 843, 849 & n.157.
26. See, e.g., id. at 809, 819. They also claim that "[i]f public officers are fiduciaries,
then their actions must be made on behalf of the public." Id. at 852. Depending on
what is meant by "on behalf of," this claim may be false. A public office holder might
seek to advance the cause ofjustice without seeking to advance the public's interests.
If so, that public office holder could still be a fiduciary.
27. See Miller & Gold, supra note 9, at 523-24.
28. Id. at 569.
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In advancing the purposes at issue, there is no beneficiary at all. One
must be loyal to certain charitable purposes rather than to anyone in
particular.
This structural feature carries over (potentially) to public
fiduciaries. As we further indicate: "The same is true ofjudges.Judicial
offices are established for the benefit of the public, and their proper
exercise predictably yields public benefits, but it does not follow that
the public is a beneficiary ofjudicial offices in a formal legal sense.""
One can think of public office holders as parties who must advance
an abstract purpose without owing loyalty to anyone in particular-even
if it turns out that members of the public will benefit as a consequence.
Yet Green and Roiphe describe something different: prosecutors, on
their view, "are fiduciaries who represent the public but are appointed
or elected to pursue a particular abstract public interest, the interest in
justice."30 They explicitly state that the "prosecutors' beneficiary is the
public."" They thus view "the public" as a beneficiary in the formal sense.
I do not generally write on criminal law, nor am I expert in the law's
understanding of prosecutorial discretion. Accordingly, I make no
interpretive claim about the correct way to understand prosecutors as
fiduciaries. That said, Green and Roiphe appear to be blending
together two different accounts of public fiduciaries: (1) the account
of judges as fiduciaries that was developed by Ethan Leib and co-
authors (which emphasizes a fiduciary obligation to the public as a
beneficiary),32 and (2) the account of fiduciary governance developed
by Miller and myself (which emphasizes a fiduciary obligation to
advance an abstract purpose).33
This blending of types also has some practical implications. Because
Green and Roiphe find that the public is a beneficiary, they seek to
figure out whether the public's wishes must be considered and even
deferred to by prosecutors.34 It is worth noting that some private law
fiduciaries must defer to a beneficiary's wishes (e.g., agents), while
others need not (e.g., trustees); deference to a beneficiary's wishes is
29. Id.
30. Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 809.
31. See id. at 813.
32. See EthanJ. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory ofJudging, 101 CALIF. L. REv. 699, 720-
21 (2013).
33. See Miller & Gold, supra note 9, at 562-63.
34. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 840-41.
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not inevitable in fiduciary settings.35 Yet any puzzles concerning the
public's wishes should recede if there is no determinate beneficiary. If,
for example, prosecutors were tasked with advancing justice much like
the trustees of a charitable purpose trust are tasked with advancing a
charitable purpose, that would be a true fiduciary governance
mandate. There would be no identifiable beneficiary with wishes to
consider. As far as I can tell, however, Green and Roiphe are not
describing a fiduciary governance mandate.
I think this puzzle-the proper degree of deference to a beneficiary's
wishes-is one of the most difficult and important questions in public
fiduciary theory. Theorists have paid much attention to the problem of
identifying the beneficiary in public fiduciary settings, and a great deal
of emphasis has also been placed on the objectives a public fiduciary
should have. Yet, the question of paternalism versus obedience to
instructions is just as fundamental. In some contexts, like trust law,
fiduciary principles may call for a degree of paternalism.36 In other
cases, like pure agency law cases, the nature of the undertaking at issue
may call for obedience to instructions.37 Still, many fiduciary
relationships are not so easily identified as one or the other type, and
public fiduciary settings often face indeterminacy on this question.
While fiduciary governance mandates may fall outside of this debate,
there is much still to be said about how paternalistic-if at all-a public
fiduciary may be.
Let's bracket these conceptual concerns and proceed to some
additional questions raised by the conception that Green and Roiphe
adopt. They claim that there is a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the public
that is to be pursued by advancing the cause ofjustice.3 8 That is a very
interesting claim with a rich set of implications, and I will consider
some further inquiries that this claim invites.
First, what kind of justice does this loyalty involve? One might think
that prosecutors should be concerned with a kind of justice that is
specific to a particular prosecution. Compare the following language
from Green and Roiphe's article: "Because, as fiduciary theory helps
clarify, the prosecutor's duty is to guard justice, not the public's
interest in general, however, it follows that considerations intrinsic to
35. See Miller & Gold, supra note 9, at 559.
36. See Miller & Gold, supra note 9, at 559.
37. See id. at 559.
38. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 834-35.
2020] 71
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 70:65
the justness of a case ought to take precedence over any other public
value."39 Yet not every approach to justice in a legal system requires
doing justice between the parties in particular cases.40 Does Green and
Roiphe's account focus on the pursuit of justice between the parties
with respect to particular cases?
Green and Roiphe also call for prosecutors to advance justice norms
based on understandings that evolve across time.41 A prosecutor
concerned with this kind of justice may not just be worried about
justice in any one case, for she will presumably care about a series of
disputes that will be litigated over future decades. Moreover, this
picture sounds like it is tethered to the understandings of justice that
have been elaborated by prosecutors in the past.42 There is no reason
why such an approach must coincide with an overarching concern for
justice in a particular case, even though it is possible that doing case-
specific justice will advance and contribute to such evolving norms.
There is also another potential relationship between justice and a
prosecutor's fiduciary loyalty. A prosecutor might be loyal to the
public, at least indirectly, by providing the kind ofjustice required by
a criminal law statute-and this might qualify as loyal conduct even if
the result is not in the public's best interests. Alternatively, a
prosecutor might instead be loyal to the public by providing the kind
of justice that is in the public's best interests, or that a prosecutor
believes is in the public's best interests. And there are other possibilities
as well. With such possibilities in mind, is the fiduciary prosecutor
someone who must pursue the public's best interests? If so, how is that
to be squared with the justice-focused loyalty that prosecutors owe? At
several points, Green and Roiphe refer to the public's interest injustice,
and it is unsurprising that a loyal fiduciary who owes loyalty to the
39. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
40. Cf. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE NEW PRIVATE LAw 52, 68 (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., 2020) (linking civil recourse
to the conditions of ajust liberal democracy).
41. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 813 ("[W]hile prosecutors' beneficiary is
the public, prosecutors serve the public not by satisfying the preferences of an amalgam
of citizens at a particular moment in time but by pursuing the abstract public interest in
justice that is, and ought to be, elaborated within prosecutors' offices over time."); see also
id. at 818 (indicating that prosecutors "discern, and contribute to developing, the
collective understanding ofjustice as they implement it in any given case").
42. See id. at 819 ("[W]ithin the confines of the law, prosecutors have vast
discretion.... Professional tradition or consensus and office policies may also work to
fill in the gaps.").
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public would take this interest into account in some way.43 Yet, not all
types of justice advance the best interests of the public-indeed, some
types of perfectly legitimate justice may actually leave the public as a
whole worse off on various measures (e.g., in terms of economic
hardship, or in terms of social stability)." Much depends on how "best
interests" are defined, but there is a reason for the saying: fiat justitia
ruat coelum.45 The pursuit ofjustice could sometimes cause severe harm
to the public, all things considered.
As far as I can tell, Green and Roiphe do contemplate an obligation
to pursue justice in the best interests of the public, at least some of the
time. As they state: "[t]he discretionary power of prosecutors at the
core of their fiduciary mission derives from making these sorts of
calculations in the best interest of the public rather than at its behest.""
How does a prosecutor pursue justice such that it is in the best interests
of the public? Is there a certain type of justice that corresponds to this
goal?
To be clear, I am not suggesting that fiduciary loyalty always requires
someone to act in the best interests of a beneficiary. Some think that
being a fiduciary inevitably calls for acting in the best interests of a
beneficiary.4 7 I think this view is false, and not just because some
fiduciary mandates lack beneficiaries. Loyalty does not always answer
to a best interests standard, and fiduciary law is replete with types of
loyalty that diverge considerably from what a beneficiary's best
interests require. An agent's duty of obedience provides salient
examples (if obedience is viewed in loyalty terms), as does loyalty that
requires a fiduciary to "be true" to her beneficiary.48
43. See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 809, 819.
44. See id. at 846, 857-58.
45. Loosely translated as: "[L]et justice be done, though the sky should fall."
Andrew S. Gold, Pernicious Loyalty, 62 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming Mar. 2021)
(quoting PHILIP PETTIT, THE ROBUST DEMANDS OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITH ATTACHMENT,
VIRTUE, AND RESPECT 223 (2015)). An overly zealous adherence to the fiat justitia rule
by a loyal fiduciary may also cause problems. See id.
46. Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 812.
47. See Lionel D. Smith, Contract, Consent, and Fiduciary Relationships, in CONTRACT,
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAw 135 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016) ("If the
result of the interpretive exercise is the conclusion that the powers are held
managerially, the relationship is fiduciary. This means, first, that the powers must be
exercised in what the fiduciary believes are the best interests of the beneficiary."
(footnotes omitted)).
48. Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 881, 888 (2017)
(describing a conception of loyalty as "being true"). On the gap between being true
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Nevertheless, let's assume that prosecutors should advance the
public's best interests. Once we recognize that loyalty and best interests
can diverge, the challenges ramify quickly. Could it not turn out that
the best interests of the public will require less complete justice in a
particular case? Or that the best interests of the public will require a
kind of justice that deviates from the evolving norms of justice that
Green and Roiphe endorse?" Perhaps the answer to these concerns is
to understand "best interests" as a term of art, but in that case we need
to know more about this term of art and its content.
I will not seek to resolve any of these puzzles here, as Green and
Roiphe know better than I do which kind of loyalty is involved in
prosecutorial settings. What I do hope to suggest is that the puzzles
that arise are potentially complex. If these puzzles are complex,
however, that is also to be expected. Fiduciary theorists are only just
beginning to think through how loyalty and justice interrelate in the
public fiduciary setting. Green and Roiphe's account is a major step
forward in that it suggests one, and possibly several, new ways to
conceptualize a fiduciary's justice-focused loyalties.
and best interests approaches, see id. On the gap between obedience-centered loyalty
and best interests approaches, see Gold, supra note 8, at 69.
49. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 820, 836.
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